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As the implications of the 2008–09 financial crisis for 
the world economy and markets have become clearer, 
many foundation executives and investment commit-
tees are reassessing their approach to endowment 
management. This essay reports on the effects of the 
recent turmoil on foundation endowments thus far, 
and offers lessons from the crisis and earlier ones that 
could help boards and investment committees respon-
sible for foundation endowments avoid mistakes 
going forward. The essay concludes with an analysis of 
alternative models available to foundations for manag-
ing their endowments, highlighting the strengths and 
weaknesses of each and providing recommendations 
on preferred models. 
A Bear Stock Market of Epic Proportions:  
The Impact on Private Foundations
The bear market in stocks that began in October of 
2007 and apparently bottomed in early March 2009 
constituted the second most severe crash in stock 
prices on record—exceeded only by the September 
1929 to June 1932 crash that ushered in the global 
Great Depression (Exhibit 1). Tellingly, the recent 
market decline exceeded by substantial margins any of 
the bear market declines that the current generation of 
endowment managers had experienced in their careers.
As a result of the market crash of 2008–09, the 
returns of most foundation endowments in the fiscal 
year ending on June 30, 2009, were severely nega-
tive: the average for 420 university and foundation 
endowments tracked by Cambridge Associates was 
–19.1 percent for the year (Exhibit 2). The crash has 
changed the financial landscape for foundations: 
most are now faced with three-, five-, and 10-year 
average annual returns well below the 5-percent-
plus-inflation rate needed to ensure perpetuity. 
Prior to the recent market crash, large founda-
tion endowments with sophisticated investment 
strategies, patterned on those of major university 
endowments like Yale’s, outperformed smaller endow-
ments with more conservative investment strategies.1 
Because all asset classes except U.S. government 
bonds joined in the 2008–09 market rout, the risk-
reducing benefits of diversification expected of the 
Yale endowment management model disappeared 
during the recent financial crisis—with the result 
that larger endowments uncharacteristically per-
formed no better than smaller ones over the last year, 
and many did worse (Exhibit 3).
Photo: Robert C. Pozen, chair of Mfs investment Management, and william Y. Yun, executive vice president of Alternative investments for franklin 
templeton investments, are members of the fund’s investment Committee, which Mr. Yun chairs. the investment Committee, supported by the 
fund’s executive vice president-COO and Cambridge Associates consultants, oversees the management of the foundation’s endowment, including 
determining the allocation among asset classes and selection of investment managers and closely monitoring investment performance.
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Exhibit 1. The 2007–08 bear market in U.S. stocks was the second-most severe  
since 1929.
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Exhibit 2. In the July 1, 2008June 30, 2009 fiscal year, university and foundation 
endowments suffered severely negative returns, pulling down their long-term 
average annual returns to levels insufficient to cover both inflation and the  
5 percent payout required of foundations.
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Following the market crash, private foundation 
assets have likely declined by over 20 percent (Exhibit 
4). March 2009 survey results reported by the 
Council on Foundations reveal that three-quarters of 
foundations experienced asset declines of 25 percent 
or more in 2008, and 47 percent reported a drop in 
endowment market value of 30 percent or more.2 
Since many foundations base their spending on the 
lagged three-year rolling average market value of 
their endowment, the immediate impact of the mar-
ket crash on giving has been muted thus far. Even so, 
the Council on Foundations survey revealed that 48 
percent of foundations reported plans to reduce the 
value of their total grantmaking by 10 percent or 
more in 2009. Sixty percent of responding founda-
tions reported cutting their operating budgets in 
2009, and 45 percent implemented salary freezes.
Will the 2009 Market Rally Last?
Along with other investors, foundation managers have 
been heartened by the global market rally that took off 
in early March 2009 (Exhibit 5). As impressive as the 
bounce-back returns have been thus far, however, they 
have not been sufficient to restore much of the wealth 
lost in the crash: the value of a dollar invested in U.S. 
stocks at the October 2007 peak was still worth only 
70 cents (before inflation) on December 31, 2009. 
More worrisome, the history of stock market episodes 
following major financial system crises is marked by 
bear market rallies that raise hopes, dashed by subse-
quent corrections—as exemplified by the 2010 stock 
market correction that began on January 19 and 
pushed down U.S. stocks by 6.5 percent by February 
12.3 Further, there is widespread agreement that the 
rally to date has been concentrated in speculative, 
lower-quality stocks and based on the expansion of 
price/earnings ratios, rather than sustainable increases 
in corporate earnings. 
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Exhibit 3. In 2008–09, the endowments of very large foundations 
uncharacteristically did not outperform those of small foundations.
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have likely declined by more than 20 percent.
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Exhibit 5. The post-crash recovery—will it last?
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Thus, venerable investors like Jeremy Grantham 
of the investment management firm GMO predict 
modest investment returns over the next seven years, 
especially in the United States: as of December 2009, 
the predicted average annual real return for large-
capitalization U.S. stocks is about 1.3 percent, and 
that for small capitalization U.S. stocks, 0.5 percent 
(Exhibit 6). Grantham does hold out the possibility 
that these returns might be increased by skilled active 
managers, but the probability of achieving better 
returns depends crucially on whether the fault lines 
in the global financial system that caused the crash 
are being properly fixed, and on the prospects for the 
revival of economic activity.
Lessons from the Financial Crisis and 
Progress Toward Financial System Reform
Among the best of the numerous books analyzing the 
causes of the crisis in the financial markets is one writ-
ten by Robert Pozen, chairman of MFS Investment 
Management and member of The Commonwealth 
Fund’s board of directors and its investment 
committee. In Too Big To Save?, Pozen describes how 
the Federal Reserve set interest rates too low from 
2001 through 2006, leading dollar investors across the 
world to search for higher yields from mortgage-
backed securities than obtainable with U.S. Treasuries.4 
This global demand, given lax regulation of many 
mortgage lenders and excessive leverage allowed in 
Wall Street banks, drove housing prices to bubble 
heights. Pozen documents how the spread of new 
financial instruments such as collateralized debt obli-
gations and credit default swaps introduced unappre-
ciated major risks into the financial system, a problem 
compounded by the trading of such securities outside 
regulated exchanges and by the conflicted position of 
credit-rating agencies, whose compensation depended 
on favorable ratings for securities they were supposed 
to score objectively. 
In his book, Pozen proposes a wide array of sys-
tem reforms that he sees as key to putting the U.S. 
and global financial system on a firm footing for 
economic stability and growth. A number of these 
proposals are included in the financial system reform 
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Exhibit 6. Many analysts predict quite modest inflation-adjusted returns  
on equities over the next seven years, with the result that foundations  
will be challenged in meeting their objective of 5 percent annually.
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legislation that is now being debated in Congress. In 
the debate, there is wide agreement on the need for 
the following reforms: a systemic risk monitor, 
higher capital requirements for financial institutions, 
more transparent and better organized markets for 
financial derivatives, as well as expansion of the fed-
eral government’s resolution authority to cover insol-
vent nonbank financial firms. Passage of reform leg-
islation, however, has been delayed by major points 
of disagreement, including the following: the scope 
of the Federal Reserve’s authority, the proper agency 
for regulating consumer financial products, and the 
supervisory framework for mega-financial institu-
tions in the system—how to insure their account-
ability and define a contained, low-cost role for 
government when they get into trouble. 
Along with all Americans, foundation endow-
ment managers have a great deal riding on the out-
come of the ongoing financial system reform debate 
in Congress. The above-noted modest investment 
returns forecast for the next seven years are predi-
cated on at least a modest economic recovery and 
average annual inflation of 2.5 percent. However, as 
documented by Carmen M. Reinhart and Kenneth 
S. Rogoff in a recently published landmark study of 
financial crises, the typical aftermath of a major 
bank-centered financial crisis involves a protracted 
period of falling GDP, often lasting two years or 
more.5 In their review of eight centuries of financial 
crises, with special focus on those in this century, 
these scholars label the current turmoil as the 
“Second Great Contraction,” ranking just below the 
one that produced the Great Depression. Thus, there 
is substantial risk that the nation may face slow 
growth and high unemployment for an extended 
period. This risk puts a premium on getting financial 
system reforms “right,” and in place as soon as pos-
sible. As Rogoff notes, “If we don’t re-regulate the 
banking system properly, we’ll either get very slow 
growth from overregulation, or another financial 
crisis in just 10 to 15 years.”6
Added to these risks are those posed by the state 
of U.S. finances—the level of government debt and 
persistent international balance of payments (current 
account) deficits that threaten long-term growth and 
stability. As Alice Rivlin, former vice chair of the 
Federal Reserve and founding director of the 
Congressional Budget Office, argues, “[T]he biggest 
economic challenge for 2010 is enacting credible 
future deficit reduction without derailing the fragile 
recovery.”7
Avoiding Mistakes
In his book, Pozen lays out the mistakes made by 
many modelers responsible for the introduction of the 
complex financial instruments, such as mortgage-
backed securities and credit default swaps, that played 
key roles in bringing the financial system to its knees 
in 2008.8 Reinhart and Rogoff similarly identify 
recurring fallacies and lessons to be drawn from the 
history of financial crises. These two bodies of work 
can help foundations avoid mistakes in managing 
their endowments. 
Simple extrapolations of the past are dangerous.1.  
Pozen cautions that “the differences between 
past and future trend lines can be as 
important as the similarities.” For example, 
given the gravity of the current financial 
crisis, foundations should be careful about 
assuming that the historical average of 
market returns will prevail over the next 
several years.
Be patient in riding out financial bubbles.2.  As 
Pozen reminds us, investment bubbles can 
last for years, but economic fundamentals 
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ultimately win out. In safeguarding against 
bubbles, foundations should base their 
budgeting and investment strategies on what 
they perceive to be long-term realities. As 
Jeremy Grantham points out, this means in 
practice that in a financial bubble like that 
of 2003–08, perpetual foundations should 
allow their spending rate (spending as a 
percentage of endowment average market 
value) to fall—thereby setting aside “fat 
years” funds for use in the lean years that 
are inevitably to come.9 More difficult, of 
course, is sticking to fundamentally sound 
investment strategies that produce below-
benchmark returns in periods of market 
excess. As Pozen concludes, “the timing of 
the burst of any bubble is impossible to 
predict, so be very patient.” 
“The frequency of extreme events is greater 3. 
than people think,” to quote Pozen again. 
Major global banking crises have occurred, 
on average, every 12 years since 1900, 
as Reinhart and Rogoff document, and 
every 11 years since 1945. For perpetual 
foundations, the occurrence within a 40-
year period of two endowment-shaking 
crises like the financial crisis and oil shock-
induced stagflation of the 1970s (when, 
as shown in Exhibit 7, it was not unusual 
for the inflation-adjusted market value 
of foundation endowments to decline by 
60 percent) and the 2008 global financial 
disorder indicates that such crises are not 
“black swan” events. Foundation managers 
would be wise to heed Pozen’s advice: pay 
more attention to low-probability events and 
hedge or insure against them if possible.
Beware of the “This Time Is Different 4. 
Syndrome.” As Reinhart and Rogoff 
describe, the thinking of the mid-2000s in 
the U.S. was “Everything is fine because 
of globalization, the technology boom, 
our superior financial system, our better 
understanding of monetary policy, and the 
phenomenon of securitized debt.” In their 
research covering multiple centuries, these 
Exhibit 7. The real value of a typical U.S. foundation’s endowment declined by over 
60 percent in the financial and stagflation crises of the late 1960s and 1970s.
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authors find similar thinking preceded 
virtually every financial crisis. Foundation 
managers should conclude that the siren call 
of “This Time Is Different” is a sure signal to 
lower the risk profile of the endowment.
Be knowledgeable of the predictors of financial 5. 
crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff present a 
convincing body of evidence that markedly 
rising asset prices (particularly housing 
bubbles), slowing real economic activity, 
large current account deficits, and sustained 
debt build-ups (public or private) generally 
precede a financial crisis. Attention to such 
systemic risk measures can help foundations 
position their endowments to better weather 
financial crises.
Understand how the origins of a financial crisis 6. 
can greatly affect the depth and duration of its 
impact on economies and markets. Reinhart 
and Rogoff’s research informs us that bubbles 
are far more dangerous when they are fueled 
by debt, as was the case with the global 
housing bubble of the early-to-mid-2000s. 
Their study reveals that global financial crises 
arising from excess leverage are typically 
followed by very severe, multiyear slowdowns 
in economic activity accompanied by high 
unemployment. Just as such crises produce 
major bear markets in stocks, so they entail 
bear market rallies followed by resumed 
slumps. Endowment managers ignore this 
pattern at considerable risk.
Ignore liquidity risk at your peril.7.  With their 
deep endowment pockets and significant 
fixed-income holdings, foundations generally 
do not worry much about liquidity. But with 
increasing commitments to private equity 
and hedge fund partnerships, liquidity 
risk was already a real concern for many 
endowments before the recent financial 
crisis. The crisis demonstrated that this risk 
rises significantly as leverage increases within 
the financial system. Thus, foundations 
should keep necessary reserves on hand and 
take increasing care that they are cautiously 
invested as financial storms gather. As yields 
fall on short-term investments, foundations 
will be lured to higher-yielding alternative 
products, but the risks and liquidity 
profiles of such products require very close 
examination. In light of recent experience, a 
number of foundations have taken out lines 
of credit, and more should consider doing so.
Be ready to question the experts.8.  Adapting 
Pozen’s advice on how banks and investment 
firms should manage their expert modelers, 
a primary role of a foundation’s investment 
committee is to understand the limitations 
of the foundation’s financial staff, consultants, 
and investment managers. Committee 
members should ask questions that push 
the so-called experts to explore fully the risks 
involved in each strategy and the assumptions 
underlying any quantitative model. 
Managing Foundation Endowments
The uncertainties arising from the 2008–09 market 
crash, the Second Great Contraction, the path of 
financial system reform, and the need to put the U.S. 
financial house in order mean that foundations face 
more challenges in managing their endowments than 
at any time since the interrelated monetary system 
crises of the late 1960s and the oil-shock-induced 
stagflation of the mid-1970s. In response to their 
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disappointing investment performance over the last 
several years, a number of foundations have already 
overhauled their approach to managing their endow-
ment. The remainder of this essay will address options 
available to others that have misgivings about the suit-
ability of their current model. 
By the early 1980s, foundation managers, their 
investment consultants, and academic researchers 
had come to recognize that decisions regarding asset 
class allocation generally have greater impact on 
investment performance than does the choice of 
investment managers or individual securities—
important as the latter two components of endow-
ment management are. The widely used pyramid 
shown in Exhibit 8 reflects this consensus, indicating 
that the most important function of endowment 
fiduciaries is to determine the asset class allocation 
appropriate to current market circumstances, then to 
select investment managers best suited to implement 
the allocation decision—leaving the task of portfolio 
construction to full-time investment professionals.
While the literature on endowment management 
is replete with research and advice on asset class 
allocation, the manager selection process, and of 
course the selection of securities for different types of 
portfolios, it is remarkably silent on the makeup of 
the base of the endowment performance pyramid: 
the endowment management model specifying the 
role of investment committees, internal financial/
investment staff, investment consultants, and exter-
nal entities assigned with responsibility for making 
asset allocation and manager decisions.10 Reflecting 
the bias of the research literature, foundation invest-
ment committees spend most of their time on invest-
ment strategy, when it is often the case that as much 
attention needs to be given to discussion of the ideal 
management model for making the most of the 
endowment.
The universe of private foundations is far more 
diverse than that of colleges and universities, com-
prising some 29,000 organizations in 2008 that 
range in size from tiny foundations with assets of less 
than $100,000 to the Bill and Melinda Gates 
Foundation, with assets of $38 billion. As shown in 
Exhibit 9, the distribution of foundation assets is 
heavily concentrated in some 300 organizations with 
Securities 
selection
Manager 
selection
Asset class 
allocation
Endowment 
management 
model
Source: Adapted from J. E. Craig, Jr., “Treasurer’s Report,“ The Commonwealth Fund 1994 Annual Report.
Exhibit 8. The management model of a foundation endowment ranks with  
asset class allocation as a key determinant of long-term performance. 
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4,966 Small foundations, 
with $10 million–$49.9 
million endowment
273 Large foundations, with 
$250 million–$1.99 billion 
endowment
31 Very Large foundations, 
with $2 billion–$11.99 
billion endowment
Source: The Foundation Center. 2007 data for 75,187 foundations with assets totaling $682 billion.
1 Mega foundation, with $12 
billion or more endowment
45,513 Micro foundations, with less 
than $1 million endowment
23,032 Very Small foundations, 
with $1 million–$9.9 million 
endowment
1,371 Midsize foundations, 
with $50 million–$249.9 
million endowment
Exhibit 9. The distribution of foundation assets is heavily concentrated in  
some 300 foundations with assets of $250 million or more.
assets of $250 million or more, but even within this 
group, the size range is enormous. This diversity, as 
well as the uniqueness of each foundation’s mission, 
culture, and history, makes it difficult to develop 
general lessons on how best to structure the manage-
ment of an endowment. Even so, it is hoped that the 
following analysis will help fill an important gap 
affecting the performance of the foundation sector. 
Foundation Endowment Management 
Models
The schematic in Exhibit 10 presents five basic mod-
els available to foundations for managing their endow-
ments and the approximate level of delegation of 
authority by investment committees that goes with 
each. As the chart indicates, the delegation level for 
each model ranges substantially from foundation to 
foundation.
Solo investment committee model.•	  In this 
common approach, typically employed by 
very small foundations but also by many 
small and even midsize ones, the investment 
committee of the board has virtually all 
strategic and operational responsibility for the 
endowment—working with little or no internal 
staff or consultant support, although generally 
delegating portfolio management to a brokerage 
firm, mutual funds, or external investment 
managers (typically using commingled funds 
shared with other investors).
Investment committee-investment consultant •	
model. As foundation size and investment 
strategy complexity increase, many investment 
committees recognize the need for an 
investment consultant to help inform and 
guide their decisions, and sometimes to help 
implement them. The amount of responsibility 
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Source: Cambridge Associates.
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Exhibit 11. Over the last 25 years, larger private foundations have increasingly 
diversified their endowment portfolios, substantially increasing allocations to  
a variety of equity markets and reducing fixed income allocations.
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But investment committees of smaller foundations can and should 
delegate a fair amount of their responsibilities as well.
Exhibit 10. The larger the foundation, the more responsibility investment 
committees must delegate to consultants, internal chief investment officers,  
or outsourced CIOs.
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delegated by the committee ranges significantly 
under this model, depending on the capacities 
and preferences of the committee and the ability 
and services offered by the consultant.
Investment committee-internal financial staff-•	
investment consultant model. Any foundation 
with assets of $250 million or more is likely to 
pursue the sophisticated diversified investment 
strategy shown in Exhibit 11. Under these 
circumstances, the day-to-day responsibilities of 
managing the endowment require qualified staff; 
moreover, barring an investment committee 
member with the time, inclination, and 
expertise for working closely with the consultant 
on strategic and operational issues like manager 
searches, a professional staff member is needed 
to ensure best use of the time and skills of the 
consultant and committee members. Thus, 
this model entails still higher de facto (if not 
formal) levels of responsibility delegation by the 
investment committee. 
Internal CIO model.•	  Once a foundation 
reaches the $2 billion or so level in endowment 
assets, it becomes economic and feasible for it 
to hire a full-time, highly trained, experienced 
chief investment officer (CIO) and recruit a 
sizeable, dedicated professional investment 
team, compensated at the necessary competitive 
levels.11 As described by Lawrence E. Kochard 
and Cathleen M. Rittereiser, a number of 
very large foundations including the Carnegie 
Corporation and William and Flora Hewlett 
Foundation use this model and have achieved 
considerable success.12
Outsourced-CIO (O-CIO) model.•	  Given the 
shortcomings of the solo investment committee, 
committee-consultant, and committee-financial 
staff-consultant models discussed below, the 
trend in recent years is for foundations with 
under $2 billion dollars in assets to fully 
outsource the management of their endowment 
to a firm that essentially offers a packaged 
set of services comparable to those that very 
large foundations obtain with an in-house 
CIO (Exhibit 12). The O-CIO firm—the 
best being the creation of a stellar former CIO 
Exhibit 12. Increasingly, nonprofits are fully outsourcing the management of  
their endowments.
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of a large university endowment or pension 
fund—assumes most of the responsibility for 
managing the endowment. While the amount 
of delegated authority varies from foundation to 
foundation, most investment committees using 
this model have an essentially advisory role and, 
beyond consultation on broad strategy, leave 
decisions on managers and tactical moves to the 
O-CIO. The spectrum of actual services offered 
by O-CIOs is wide, ranging from somewhat 
customized portfolios to one-size-fits-all 
proprietary portfolios.13 
Small foundations are leading the trend toward 
the O-CIO model, but foundations in the $250 mil-
lion to $2 billion range are also attracted to it—in 
large part because of their increased use of “alterna-
tive” investments like hedge funds, private equity, 
venture capital, real estate, and timberland, and the 
difficulties of identifying and gaining access to top-
ranked managers of this type on their own. 
Contributing to the trend also is the disappointment 
of many midsize and large foundations with their 
existing investment committee- or consultant-driven 
management model in the recent financial crisis.14 
Foundations that have gone this route include the 
Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Colonial Williamsburg 
Foundation, John A. Hartford Foundation, Teagle 
Foundation, and Chichester DuPont Foundation.
It should be noted that the universe of firms 
offering the O-CIO model is diverse. While firms 
established by distinguished former CIOs of large 
university endowment or pension funds attract the 
most attention, many traditional investment consul-
tants now offer such services (partly out of competi-
tive necessity). Additionally, some traditional top-
ranked balanced managers serve as O-CIOs to insti-
tutions like the Greenwall Foundation, although 
their products do not include alternative invest-
ments. Some offices of wealthy families also offer 
O-CIO services to selected clients other than the 
founding family, and, of course, banks have for years 
performed this function for foundations organized as 
trusts.
The strengths and weaknesses of each of these 
models are summarized in Exhibits 13a and 13b. 
The primary strength of the solo investment com-
mittee model is that it leaves, in theory, no doubt 
regarding where accountability for the management 
of the endowment lies. All too often, however, foun-
dations employing this model shy away from the 
investments performance tracking that would help 
tell them how well their investment committee is 
functioning. Even when a record of below-market 
performance is clear, some boards are unwilling to 
hold the investment committee accountable for it. 
Small and even midsize foundations can find it dif-
ficult to attract board members with sufficient 
investment experience and expertise and the time or 
inclination to fully direct their skills to management 
of the endowment. Further, committee members are 
likely to develop a very limited set of investment 
managers from which to choose and may favor those 
they know—with attendant potential conflicts of 
interest. Indeed, board member conflicts of interest 
in the management of endowments arise all too fre-
quently, and require firm attention by board and 
audit committee chairs.
Even with effective leadership, investment com-
mittees operating alone are sometimes challenged in 
reaching consensus and taking action, or fall into the 
trap of “group think.” Under these circumstances, 
most small foundations using this model are best off 
employing only mutual funds, with a strong bias 
toward low-cost mutual fund indexes. Even so, the 
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Exhibit 13a. The strengths of foundation endowment management models.
Solo Investment 
Committee
Investment 
Committee-
Consultant
Investment 
Committee-
Consultant-
Internal Staff
Internal CIO 
& Dedicated 
Investment Staff
Outsourced CIO
Committee exercises 
full responsibility for the 
endowment—no ques-
tion of where  account-
ability lies, provided 
performance is tracked 
and board holds com-
mittee accountable
Consultant brings:
Advice on asset •	
allocation based 
on wide range 
of contacts and 
experience
strong financial •	
research base
information on and •	
access to a wide 
range of investment 
managers, including 
managers of 
nontraditional 
alternatives like 
hedge funds and 
venture capital
independent voice, •	
helping build 
consensus, avoid 
conflicts of interest
More effective •	
use of consultant, 
customization 
of services to 
foundation’s 
particular needs 
Better oversight of •	
investment managers 
and endowment 
operations
More accountability•	
More safeguards •	
regarding conflicts of 
interest
More integration of •	
investment mission 
with program mission
full and measurable •	
accountability for 
management of the 
endowment
high level of •	
internal investment 
experience, expertise, 
and research capacity
Capacity to identify •	
and gain access 
to top-ranked 
managers, especially 
to nontraditional  
alternatives and 
rising-star managers
undivided loyalty •	
of CiO  to the 
foundation
Potential •	
contributions of 
CiO to foundation’s 
program strategy 
(investment insights)
Potential solution •	
to “missing chief 
investment officer” 
problem for 
foundations with 
assets <$2 billion
full and measurable •	
accountability for 
management of the 
endowment
high level of •	
investment 
experience and 
expertise
Pre-hiring investment •	
track record
Capacity to identify •	
and gain access 
to top-ranked 
managers, especially 
to alternatives and 
rising-star managers
Proactive, rather than •	
passive advice
Performance fees•	
Limited number of •	
clients, low conflict-
of-interest risk 
with O-CiO, if not 
also an investment 
consultant
weaknesses of the solo investment committee model 
are such that it is prone to being suboptimal.
Adding a qualified investment consultant to the 
investment committee model helps address many of 
these issues, but not all. The chief weakness of the 
investment-committee-with-consultant model is that 
responsibility for decision-making is muddied, and it 
is difficult for the board to hold either the committee 
or consultant accountable if things go wrong. While 
investment consultants bring research, experience, 
and contacts that are extremely valuable in building 
consensus, setting strategy, and hiring and firing 
managers, they can be more passive in providing 
advice than is desirable. Additionally, the quality of 
investment consulting firms can range widely, as can 
the value-adding capacity of any single consultant 
within even a strong firm.
There are other weaknesses as well. First, the 
performance record of investment consultants is 
reputational, not statistical, which presents a chal-
lenge in the hiring decision.15 Second, consultants 
have many clients competing for their best ideas and 
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Solo Investment 
Committee
Investment 
Committee-
Consultant
Investment 
Committee-
Consultant-
Internal Staff
Internal CIO 
& Dedicated 
Investment Staff
Outsourced CIO
Challenges in •	
recruiting members 
with sufficient 
investment 
experience and 
ability to commit 
required time and 
attention
significant conflicts •	
of interest risk
Potential board •	
reluctance to 
hold committee 
accountable
Challenges of •	
achieving consensus 
while avoiding “group 
think”
no investment •	
research capacity
Limited capacity •	
for identifying and 
gaining access to top-
ranked managers—
especially managers 
of alternatives and 
rising stars
Accountability •	
weakened by 
diffusion of 
responsibility 
and resulting 
difficulties regarding 
performance 
attribution
in hiring a consultant, •	
reliance on references 
unsubstantiated 
by verifiable track 
records
Variable quality •	
of individual 
consultants within 
a firm
Competition among •	
many clients for 
consultant’s attention 
and firm’s best 
ideas and access to 
best managers—
significant consultant 
conflicts of interest 
risk 
Can be passive in •	
offering advice—
when conviction is 
needed
unlikely to identify or •	
propose innovative 
rising-star managers
Effective •	
management of 
consultant can be  
an issue
weaknesses •	
of investment 
Committee-
Consultant model 
mitigated, but not 
eliminated, and 
performance of 
model depends 
heavily on ability of 
internal financial staff 
to add value
given multiple •	
responsibilities 
and compensation 
issues, difficulties of 
attracting staff able 
to add value 
Competing •	
responsibilities of 
internal financial 
staff, limiting their 
ability to add value to 
investment process
Economic only for •	
foundations with 
$2 billion or more 
endowment
Challenges of •	
recruiting and 
retaining star CiO, 
compensation issues
Potential oversight •	
issues
Potential culture •	
conflicts between 
program and 
investments staffs
key person risk•	
Possible limits on •	
customization of 
strategy/services to 
individual foundation 
needs
significant conflicts •	
of interest risk 
for O-CiO, if also 
an investment 
consultant
Adequacy of •	
oversight by 
foundation 
investment 
committee
Limited number •	
of truly able O-CiO 
firms available, and 
limitations on their 
client capacity
Concern that •	
outsourcers will, over 
time, add clients 
beyond optimal level 
Exhibit 13b. The weaknesses of foundation endowment management models.
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access to the best firms in their pools of investment 
managers. Third, consultants are unlikely to recom-
mend partially tested, rising-star managers or cut-
ting-edge products—although achieving above-mar-
ket performance virtually depends on beating other 
investors to new investment approaches. Finally, as 
with any consultant, investment consultants provide 
their best work through a strong working relation-
ship with, and guidance from the client; yet many 
investment committee chairs lack the time required 
to provide such guidance.16
Foundations with assets of roughly $150 million 
or more find it economic to seek to enrich the poten-
tial of the investment committee-consultant model 
by assigning a qualified foundation staff member 
responsibility for managing the consultant and 
orchestrating investment committee meetings. With 
the right experience, training, and judgment, an 
internal chief financial officer can greatly strengthen 
the committee’s ability to make the most of the 
investment consultant’s skills, ward against any prob-
lematic conflicts of interest, ensure firmer daily over-
sight of endowment operations and their integration 
with the foundation’s operating needs, and bring 
helpful investment insights to program strategy and 
grantmaking. Even so, while accountability can be 
enhanced by the addition of qualified staff, it remains 
an issue. More seriously, staff in these roles typically 
have multiple and substantial other responsibilities 
within the foundation, and may lack either or both 
the time or expertise to produce all the benefits of 
this approach. Foundations employing this model, 
moreover, often face a major challenge in identifying 
and adequately compensating a staff person able to 
meet the many demands of the assigned role.
The vitally missing piece in the first three models 
is a chief investment officer—a role which should 
arguably be assigned, at least de facto, to someone in 
any organization totally dependent on an endow-
ment for income. Well executed, the internal CIO 
model addresses most of the shortcomings of the first 
three models. Besides being unaffordable for all but 
about 30 of the largest private foundations, however, 
the chief weaknesses of this approach are the chal-
lenges of recruiting and retaining a highly qualified 
CIO, particularly given the compensation such indi-
viduals draw in other settings.17 While CIOs can add 
value to the foundation’s programs, culture clashes 
between programmatic and investment staffs do 
arise, and the foundation needs to take care that the 
values of the foundation and the CIO are fully 
aligned, and that the strong personality that is typi-
cally a CIO trait fits into the foundation’s manage-
ment structure.
Like the internal CIO model, the outsourced-
CIO model also addresses most of the weaknesses of 
alternative management approaches. The constraint 
here is the number of highly qualified individuals 
and firms to which such responsibility can be safely 
delegated. As predicted in a study by Casey Quirk 
and Associates, many former large university or pen-
sion fund heads will set themselves up as O-CIOs in 
the coming years—but not all will be true invest-
ment stars.18 The ability of the largest group of 
entrants into this business—established investment 
consultants—to deliver high-quality O-CIO services 
stands a substantial risk of being compromised by 
their responsibilities to existing consulting clients 
and their questionable ability to attract truly out-
standing investment professionals. There are also 
concerns that while existing O-CIO firms restrict the 
number of clients to the small number needed to 
ensure above-market returns, they will be pressured 
over time to grow the firm beyond an asset level that 
is optimal for clients.
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Other issues with O-CIO firms include the 
extent to which they can customize services to the 
needs of individual foundations and the extent to 
which an investment committee feels it has adequate 
oversight of the O-CIO. Among the best of existing 
O-CIOs, any shortcomings on these issues are more 
than offset by their skills and thus performance. 
The remaining risk, “key person,” is thus the primary 
one—the viability and strength of the firm should it 
lose its star CIO. This risk is real, as most outstand-
ing O-CIO firms are small. At the same time, given 
the newness of this model, few such firms are likely 
to face a transition in leadership for the foreseeable 
future.
To sum up, the three existing endowment man-
agement models used by most foundations—solo 
investment committee, investment committee with 
consultant, and investment committee with consul-
tant and limited financial staff—all have serious 
limitations that make it unlikely that they will pro-
duce, over the long term, returns greater than those 
of the market and present considerable risk of gener-
ating below-market returns. Yet very few foundations 
are likely to be able to pursue the two alternative 
models, because of the economic infeasibility of the 
CIO approach for most foundations and the limited 
availability and capacity constraints of truly out-
standing firms able to serve as outsourced CIOs. 
Fortunately, The Investment Fund for 
Foundations (TIFF) was established in 1991 to help 
overcome many of the shortcomings of the principal 
endowment management models available to most 
foundations. Patterned after the CommonFund, 
which was established for educational institutions in 
1971, TIFF enables foundation and other nonprofit 
investment committees to get out of the business of 
identifying and selecting managers by offering pooled 
funds invested by teams of multiple managers hired 
by the TIFF board.19 The range of products offered 
by TIFF is wide—from mutual funds for conven-
tional U.S. equities, international equities, and 
bonds, to hedge fund, private equity, and natural-
resources investment pools. In addition, TIFF’s 
Multi-Asset Fund provides foundations an efficient 
vehicle for fully outsourcing the management of the 
endowment. While not offering investment consult-
ing services, TIFF staff does help educate foundation 
trustees on asset class allocation and other invest-
ment issues. Operating as a nonprofit cooperative 
and with a highly trained and experienced staff and 
board, including some of the most respected endow-
ment and pension fund CIOs in the country, TIFF 
avoids many of the pitfalls, articulated so well by Yale 
University’s David Swensen, of management 
approaches dominated by for-profit fund-of-fund 
managers, consultants, and inadequately equipped 
investment committees.20 
Given the strengths and weaknesses of this array 
of approaches for managing foundation endowments, 
the following recommendations seem appropriate:
Foundations with assets of $2 billion or more •	
will generally be best off by hiring a highly 
qualified chief investment officer, supported by 
a sizeable dedicated internal investments staff.
For other foundations, particularly those with •	
assets in the range of $500 million to under 
$2 billion or so, identifying an outstanding 
outsourced-CIO firm is the preferable 
approach. Foundations with assets of $20 
million–$50 million are also prime candidates 
for this approach, as their size is well suited for 
rounding out an O-CIO’s portfolio of clients. 
The limited supply and capacity of outstanding 
O-CIO managers, however, means that 
relatively few foundations will actually be able 
to successfully execute this model.
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Great care, obviously, must be taken in selecting •	
an O-CIO, with respect not only to their 
qualifications but also to potential conflicts of 
interest involving board members. Given the 
amount of delegation of board responsibilities 
involved, any conflicts of interest should be 
avoided, and most committees would benefit 
from using a consultant to professionalize the 
search for, and screening of, candidates. The 
obvious conflicts of interest that investment 
consultants face in simultaneously serving 
traditional and O-CIO clients lead to the 
conclusion that, with rare exceptions, the 
O-CIO responsibility should not be delegated 
to consultants. As with any investment manager, 
the performance of an O-CIO should be judged 
over a market cycle.
Foundations with assets under $2 billion that •	
are unable or disinclined to outsource should 
make the most of the investment committee-
consultant-internal financial staff model by 
taking maximum advantage of the products 
offered by TIFF or other nonprofit fund-of- 
fund managers.
Foundations with less than $100 million in •	
assets may not be able to retain internal staff 
capable of adding value to the investment 
committee’s work, but only the smallest 
foundations (assets of $20 million or less) can 
justify, for economic reasons, going without 
the benefits of an investment consultant. 
Smaller foundations that choose not to use an 
investment consultant should make all the more 
use of TIFF by taking full advantage of the 
investment educational services and advice that 
it offers. 
Making the Most of Investment Consultants
Since most foundation investment committees should 
supplement their skills with those of an investment 
consultant, it is well to consider guidelines for selecting 
and using such consultants effectively. As Robert 
Marchesi has written, there are more than 100 invest-
ment consulting firms in the United States, and the 
scope and quality of their services vary enormously.21 
In selecting a consultant, the first task of an 
investment committee is to define the level of ser-
vices it needs to address gaps in the committee’s 
capacities. Most committees need a significant num-
ber of services from their consultant, including 
investment research, investment strategy, manager 
searches and selection, and regular consultation with 
the committee and internal staff. If the foundation 
lacks internally or through its securities custodian 
the ability to measure and report investment 
performance, this service should also be sought from 
the consultant.
Exhibits 14a and 14b summarize desirable and 
undesirable traits to look for when selecting an 
investment consultant for a foundation endowment. 
A strong weight should be placed on the consultant 
team’s investment experience and training, but 
equally important is the firm’s business structure, 
with particular attention to conflicts of interest. The 
investment committee should probe to see if the 
consultant is honest about its own strengths and 
weaknesses, and whether it is willing to recommend 
competitors (e.g., TIFF or low-cost index funds) 
when they offer superior products. As the Madoff 
scandal of 2008 demonstrates, the investment con-
sultant should be able to explain the investment 
strategy of any firm in its stable of managers, and 
should demonstrate deep knowledge of each firm’s 
business. Regardless of recommendations from the 
consultant’s existing clients, a foundation investment 
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Exhibit 14a. Selecting an endowment investments consultant—essential traits.
firm is independent, with no ownership conflicts. •	
firm displays high level of integrity and appreciation of •	
conflicts of interest that arise regularly in investing. 
firm recognizes its limitations—does not, for example, offer •	
O-CiO services that it is poorly equipped to provide.
the lead consultant offered by the firm is skilled and •	
experienced, and interacts well with investment committee 
members and staff. 
the lead consultant is backed up by a deep team of •	
researchers and investment professionals with a wide range 
of contacts in the investment manager business. 
Lead consultant advises with conviction, strengthening •	
committee’s decision-making process. 
firm is transparent on the investment managers with •	
which it works and is able to fully document and explain 
any recommended manager’s investment strategy, 
performance, and risks.
firm has a range of investment manager types in its •	
stable—with respect to size, investment style, age, risk/
reward profile—and has a record of identifying promising 
new managers and recommending them for clients’ 
consideration when appropriate. 
if the foundation is large enough to invest in the •	
“alternatives” areas, the consulting firm has demonstrated 
capacity to identify top-ranked managers of this type and 
gain access to them for its clients. 
firm is willing to recommend tiff and other nonprofit •	
pooled fund products, as well as low-cost index funds when 
these can serve the client best. 
the foundation will be an important client to the consulting •	
firm, ranking high in its pecking order for recommending 
clients to leading investment managers.  
firm and proffered lead consultant produce multiple strong •	
client references. 
firm offers a competitive fee structure, with no imbedded •	
conflicts of interest.
Exhibit 14b. Selecting an endowment investments consultant—traits to be avoided.
firm owned by a larger business selling investment •	
products posing conflicts of interest. 
firm has a record of involvement in conflicts of interest, •	
questionable practices. 
firm is essentially a “feeder” for large investment managers, •	
mainly serving to steer clients to established managers.
firm offers services—e.g., O-CiO, that it is ill-equipped to •	
provide.
firm’s team has questionable investment training and •	
experience.
Concern that the proffered lead consultant may not be their •	
best, or that interactions with the lead consultant could 
prove problematic.
Lead consultant is passive in giving advice, weakening •	
committee decision-making process. 
firm is secretive regarding its investment manager pool •	
and is unable to document and explain some managers’ 
strategy, performance, and risks.
firm is so small that it is likely to offer the same set of •	
investment managers to all clients, and be limited in its 
ability to identify and recruit promising new managers to 
its stable. 
firm is unable to identify and gain access to leading •	
managers in important areas in which the foundation 
wishes to invest. 
firm is unwilling to recommend tiff or other nonprofit •	
pooled funds or low-cost index funds when appropriate, 
instead offering up inferior products for its own business 
reasons. 
the foundation will be a marginal client for the firm, •	
unlikely to receive “preferred customer” attention in 
opening doors to skilled investment managers. 
Client references on the firm or proposed lead consultant •	
are limited and inconclusive.
firm has noncompetitive fee structure or fee arrangements •	
posing potential conflicts of interest.
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committee and staff should focus on the ability of 
the lead consultant to meet the particular needs of 
the foundation and on the personal chemistry that 
emerges in the screening process. 
Consultants, in general, are no better than the 
individual directing the use of their services, and this 
rule applies equally in the endowment management 
business. Thus, investment committees should lay 
out clearly in the foundation’s investment policy 
statement the division of responsibilities among 
committee members, any internal staff, and the con-
sultant, and assign a specific committee member or 
staff person with responsibility for guiding the con-
sultant’s work. The foundation person charged with 
this responsibility should have available the time 
needed to advise and direct the consultant effectively. 
To play this role well, the committee member (usu-
ally the chair) or staff member should be well 
informed about the foundation’s overall financial 
picture and program objectives and skilled in using 
the consultant’s services to advance effective commit-
tee decision-making.
Just as most foundations judge the performance 
of their investment managers over a market cycle, so 
should the performance of the investment consultant 
be reviewed periodically—about every five years. 
Such reviews are best carried out in the context of 
considering a small number of alternative consultant 
firms, as the strengths and weaknesses of the existing 
consultant are more clearly illuminated by compari-
sons with other firms.
Conclusion
Every crisis presents opportunity, and many founda-
tions should at this time take a hard look at their basic 
structure for managing their endowment. In doing so, 
they should aim for accountability on the part of each 
major player sharing responsibility for the endow-
ment, and for a management model likely to make the 
most of their resources while protecting against major 
risks. In a period of great uncertainty, foundations 
should give heightened attention to the composition 
of their investment committees and to the skills and 
time priorities of members. They should also reassess 
the extent to which their investment committee is 
adequately staffed to do its job, and whether external 
resources need to be tapped to ensure strong endow-
ment management. 
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